FORGOTTEN WOMEN:
The impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women in the United Kingdom
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1. Executive summary

The ‘Forgotten Women: the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women’ aims to document the disproportionate effect of Islamophobia on Muslim women particularly in employment discrimination and the experience of hate crimes. This report focuses on the United Kingdom and is part of a project covering the impacts of Islamophobia on Muslim women. The project intends to counter stereotypes about Muslim women, promote positive messages, and develop lines of partnership between anti-racist and feminist movements to better counter the multiple forms of discrimination that Muslim women face. In the UK, Muslim women experience discrimination and racist abuse and violence based particularly on the intersection of factors including race or ethnicity, religion, and gender.

In the United Kingdom, Muslim women are penalised in the labour market and experience a significant proportion of anti-Muslim hate crimes. Research on the British labour force identifies a clear ‘Muslim penalty’, with Islamophobic stereotypes about veiling and cultural practices holding Muslim women back from attaining employment. Visibly Muslim women, such as those that wear the hijab or niqab (which are more common in Britain) or other forms of Islamic veils tend to be targeted the most with hate crime in the UK. These are significant challenges for the UK to address through civil society and legislation. Though there is robust legislation in place for discrimination in the labour market and for hate crimes, these laws are not always effectively protecting Muslim women.

This report explores the forms of discrimination against British Muslim women in the labour market and in everyday life as a consequence of racism and violence. Discrimination against Muslim women is composed of three factors: gender discrimination, racial discrimination against BME (Black and Minority Ethnicity) women, and discrimination based on misguided and misinformed stereotypes about Islam and Muslims. Deprivation and class difference compound and exacerbate these factors. Visibly Muslim women—those who veil, wearing (for example) the hijab, niqab, jilbab, or burqa—face particular penalties in the labour market. As well, visibly Muslim women are targeted frequently with verbal abuse that can escalate to assault, making them more likely targets of racism and violence. This report explores the forms of discrimination against Muslim women in the labour market and in everyday life as a consequence of racism and violence. There are over 2.7 million Muslims in
the United Kingdom, constituting approximately 4.5 per cent of the population. Muslims are clustered in areas of high deprivation, experience discrimination in the labour market at an alarming magnitude, and report the highest levels of experiences of hate crime. There are 1,332,272 Muslim women in England, Wales and Scotland.¹ Based on the entire Muslim population (including men and women), ethnic Pakistanis and Bangladeshis constitute over half of the Muslim population in England and Wales, followed by a smaller proportion of White Muslims and Black African Muslims. The majority of Muslim women are young: approximately 49 per cent of Muslim women in England and Wales are under 25 years of age. A further 35 per cent are between the ages 25 to 44 and a key demographic in the labour market. There is a similar distribution in Scotland: 47 per cent are under 25 and 37 per cent between 25 and 44 years of age.² This young demographic is increasingly well-educated, with 36 per cent of British Muslim women in London choosing to go to university (Bunglawala 2008, 4).

The United Kingdom does offer a level of freedom and inclusiveness for Muslim women to practice their religion. This is evidenced by the high levels of loyalty expressed by British Muslims to the UK, despite the significant problems that they face. Media and the press, with particular emphasis on the tabloid press, circulate anxieties about Muslims and amplify the negative stereotypes that people hold toward Muslims. The Leveson Inquiry found that the press frequently reports in a way that damages the credibility of Muslims and other minority groups. In politics, while debates to ‘ban the burqa’ continue to be discussed these is more or less limited to the far-right. While there are positive developments in politics in terms of addressing hate crime, it is unlikely that political pressure will be put on firms to implement crucial equalities monitoring. While the UK state and society, as opposed to other European countries such as France, is largely supportive of various faiths and the political claims of various faith groups, the state has been involved in problematising Muslims under a ‘suspect community’ (see Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). Counter-terrorism policing has had a significant impact in confirming and re-asserting many of the stereotypes about Muslims and Muslim women that affect them negatively. All the same, Muslim women in the UK do enjoy a high level of freedom to express their

¹ The Northern Ireland census does not include separate columns for Muslim and other non-Christian religions and is therefore very difficult to assess the number of Muslim women in Northern Ireland.
² See NOMIS Table DC2107EW and Census Scotland Table DC2107SC (Release 3a Standard).
religious identity, though recent counter-terrorism proposals threaten to heavily circumscribe their rights to political expression (Wright 2015).

There are a number of inequalities that exist that penalise British Muslim women in the labour market. Women tend to fill fewer senior roles than men in the private sector though they are better represented in the public and charity sectors. However, austerity and cuts are affective women more than men in maintaining these senior roles. Women from ethnic minorities tend to get paid less than white women of the same qualification, facing what many researchers refer to as an ‘ethnic penalty’. There is also evidence of name discrimination, where Muslim or ethnic sounding names get fewer interviews and consideration from potential employers. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women seem to face the most acute penalties in terms of unemployment and overqualification when compared to white women. There is evidence that suggests that stereotypes about Muslim women’s cultural differences drive these penalties. Finally, some research suggests that the labour market has specific penalties that are reducible to ethnoreligious identity, with Muslims being hit the hardest with discrimination.

In addition to being discriminated against in the labour market, Muslim women also face significant levels of racism, harassment, and abuse and in some cases, violence due to their religious identity. Already-existing forms of discrimination and sexism that affect British women of all ethnicities and religious confessions compound this discrimination that Muslim women experience. The challenges faced by Muslim women can be made particularly acute for those women who choose to veil. Anti-Muslim hate crimes are recorded under both racially-motivated and religiously motivated categories by police forces. According to crime surveys, South Asians report a higher level of hate crime experiences than any other ethnicity in Britain. Muslims and members of ‘other’ religions are the most likely to experience hate crimes against persons and property. Members of ‘other’ religions, including Sikhs and Jews, experience hate crimes at a lower rate than Muslims, demonstrating that Muslims are the most frequent victims of hate crime. Hate crimes usually occur in public areas in the city as well as public transit. Visibly Muslim women are particularly likely to be targeted because of the symbolism of their dress. Online hate attacks are increasing and a significant concern on social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter. These hate crimes have serious effects on victims. Verbal abuse and anti-Muslim literature are the most common incidents
online. Anti-Muslim hate crime is widely under-reported (like other strands of hate crime) for a variety of reasons. These include a sense that incidents are trivial, that the police will not secure a result, and a lack of awareness about what a hate crime actually constitutes.

2. Snapshot of inequalities

2.1 Gender

Demography

There are significant inequalities in gender in the United Kingdom, though the gap appears to be narrowing for women in some ethnicities, particularly for white women. However, pay penalties and discrimination persist. There are more women than men in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The table below provides a demographic breakdown of ethnicity and gender for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Ethnicity data is captured differently in each country so there are differences between the breakdowns for each country.

England and Wales: Census Table LC2101EW (2011 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>All persons</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All categories: Ethnic group</td>
<td>56,075,912</td>
<td>27,573,376</td>
<td>28,502,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White: Total</td>
<td>48,209,395</td>
<td>23,630,918</td>
<td>24,578,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/multiple ethnic group: Total</td>
<td>1,224,400</td>
<td>611,533</td>
<td>612,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British: Indian</td>
<td>1,412,958</td>
<td>719,920</td>
<td>693,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British: Pakistani</td>
<td>1,124,511</td>
<td>576,215</td>
<td>548,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British: Bangladeshi</td>
<td>447,201</td>
<td>230,871</td>
<td>216,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British: Chinese</td>
<td>393,141</td>
<td>186,028</td>
<td>207,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British: Other Asian</td>
<td>835,720</td>
<td>407,123</td>
<td>428,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African/Caribbean/Black British: African</td>
<td>989,628</td>
<td>479,799</td>
<td>509,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African/Caribbean/Black British: Caribbean</td>
<td>594,825</td>
<td>276,937</td>
<td>317,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African/Caribbean/Black British: Other Black</td>
<td>280,437</td>
<td>141,464</td>
<td>138,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group: Arab</td>
<td>230,600</td>
<td>134,143</td>
<td>96,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group: Any other ethnic group</td>
<td>333,096</td>
<td>178,425</td>
<td>154,671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the ethnic groups with relatively larger concentrations of Muslims (as will be covered below) such as Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, there are relatively more men than women. This is concerning as labour market penalties affect men and women, and according to some studies (Khattab and Johnston 2014) are at times worse for ethnic minority men than they are for women.

Scotland: Census Table DC20101SC (2011 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All people</td>
<td>2,567,444</td>
<td>2,727,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White: Total</td>
<td>2,458,378</td>
<td>2,626,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed or multiple ethnic groups</td>
<td>9,635</td>
<td>10,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>25,643</td>
<td>23,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>18,162</td>
<td>14,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>1,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>16,250</td>
<td>17,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>9,524</td>
<td>11,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>15,819</td>
<td>13,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Other</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>3,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicity</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>2,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scotland’s ethnic population reveals similar trends regarding females in ethnic minorities. Where there are more white women than white men in both England and Wales’s and Scotland’s Censuses, for Asians, there tends to be a higher number of men than women.

Northern Ireland: Census Table DC2601NI (Only residents aged 16 to 74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All males aged 16 to 74</th>
<th>All females aged 16 to 74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All usual residents aged 16 to 74</td>
<td>647369</td>
<td>666051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>636131</td>
<td>655976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td>2398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2415</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>1512</td>
<td>2064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Northern Ireland data shows a similar story once again; while there are more women than men across the population, there are fewer women than men in ethnic minorities with relatively higher concentrations of Muslims.

What is clear from this demography between all three countries is that ethnic minorities are more populous in England and Wales with smaller minority populations in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Minorities with Muslims however tend to have fewer females than males which is different than the overall trends for each of the countries. Employment and labour market activity is an issue for men as well as for women, but below, we will focus on ethnic minority women in England and Wales to understand their positioning in the labour market.

*Labour market inequalities, employment, and unemployment*

Muslim women are subject to three types of penalties in pay and employment equality: gender penalties, ethnic penalties, and religious penalties. The latest information on gender pay gaps from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) demonstrates that women employed full-time continue to be paid 14.2 per cent less in hourly wages than their male counterparts while women in part-time employment incur pay shortfalls of 4.8 per cent (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2014, Table 6).

Women in part-time employment experience less acute pay gaps (Perfect 2011, 6). Over time, however, full-time pay gaps have narrowed faster than part-time gaps (2011, 7). Further, these pay gaps are evident across all occupational groups and are most acute in managerial positions and least acute in sales and customer service (2011, 10). Women employed in the public sector face less intense pay penalties as compared to the private sector, which has less flexibility over gender-specific concerns including maternity leave, flexible working hours, and work-life balance (Perfect 2011, Metcalf 2009).

Women fill fewer senior roles than men. Despite gains in some sectors, there are losses in others, suggesting that increased representation in senior posts has not...
progressed significantly in recent years (between 2007 to 2011, see Equalities and Human Rights Commission 2011). Women are more likely to enter into senior roles in the public and voluntary sectors. Part of this is because this sector allows women the flexibility required to manage both work and home life, whereas this is much more difficult in the private sector due to higher expectations and longer working hours (2011, 7).

Austerity measures and public spending cuts implemented by the previous coalition government had a disproportionate impact on women, impeding further progress in gender equality. Male unemployment increased over 2009 to 2012 by 0.32 per cent while female unemployment increased over the same period by 20 per cent (Sands 2012, 7; see also Women’s Resource Centre 2013, 99). Women fill the majority of jobs in local government, the National Health Service (NHS), social care, and education (Sands 2012, 6). This further exacerbates the lack of women in senior, influential roles, as the shrinking public sector is the only stratum of the labour market that supports women’s leadership.

Given the impact of austerity, women face higher chances of unemployment due to the private sector’s policies around maternity and parental leave that significantly disadvantage them in finding jobs in the private sector (Women’s Resource Centre 2013, 105). Taking maternity leave has a significant negative impact on women: 1 in 7 women did not have a job to go back to and more than 1 in 10 women were replaced by their maternity leave cover (Slater Gordon 2013). Research demonstrates that the pay gap widens for mothers (Trade Union Congress 2014, 5). Further cuts have affected childcare as the level of entitlements for childcare support have decreased, affecting low-income women significantly when they have had to give up work due to high childcare costs (Women’s Resource Centre 2013, 107-8).

While austerity impacts women in general, Black and Minority Ethnicity women face significant and particular challenges that white women do not. Ethnic minority women face higher levels of unemployment (Women’s Resource Centre 2012, 4) and in 12 London councils, BME women constituted 5 per cent of the workforce, but 23 per cent of the redundancies (Women’s Resource Centre 2013, 7). While BME concerns are not addressed significantly in many documents regarding women’s equality in the workplace, a research on ‘ethnic penalties’ demonstrates a significant level of discrimination against Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Black women in terms of
pay equality and helps fill this gap. Recent work confirms that these penalties are compounded and intensified for those who confess an Islamic faith.

*Poverty, deprivation and exclusion*

Geography has an important impact that partly explains some of the employment gaps that affect Muslim women. ‘Homemaking’ women in relatively deprived neighbourhoods are less likely to become employed and those women residing in those areas who are employed are more likely than others to become unemployed (Feng et al 2015, 178). This reflects broader trends that men and women in deprived areas are more likely to become unemployed over time (ibid 178). Khattab et al. (2012) find that occupational and educational attainment is not affected by segregation but by the clustering of ethno-religious minorities in deprived areas. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are the most likely to be unemployed or looking after the home, a fact recognised across the studies mentioned above. Unemployment for women in all ethnic groups has increased since 2009; however, unemployment has been a significant concern for Black, Mixed, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi women (see Chart 1).

Source: Labour Force Survey, 2013 (Labour market status by ethnic group)
Impediments to equal employment access are covered in the next section; however, quantitative studies stress that part of the earning differentials experienced by Muslim women and men from ethnic minorities is due to unequal access and gaps in employment access. After controlling for a variety of factors including education, Heath and Cheung find that Pakistanis face the worst ethnic penalties, and substantial penalties affect Bangladeshis as well (2006, 21).

2.2 Islam and Muslims

Demography

Muslims are the most ethnically diverse of any religious grouping in the United Kingdom, particularly when taking into account the population in England and Wales where most British Muslims reside.

Ethnicity of Muslims in England and Wales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>77,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>1,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Traveller</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>131,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>5,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black African</td>
<td>15,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Asian</td>
<td>49,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Mixed</td>
<td>31,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>197,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1,028,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>402,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>8,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>194,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>207,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>7,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>57,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>178,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>112,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is very clear that there are large numbers of Muslims from almost every ethnic group in Britain. It is important to note that there are more white Muslims than African Muslims in the United Kingdom. Often, as the analysis of hate crime will
show, white Muslims are rather visible (particularly women who wear the hijab or practice another form of veiling) and experience racialisation when they are called ‘Paki’ or ‘terrorist’. In addition, the fact that there are so many Black Muslims, Arab Muslims, and Asian Muslims demands that we take into account an intersectional approach that examines discrimination and hate crime at ethnic, racial and religious levels.

Ethnicity of Muslims in Scotland:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Scottish</td>
<td>2,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White British</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Gypsy/Traveller</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Polish</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White British</td>
<td>2,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed or multiple ethnic groups</td>
<td>1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>44,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>4,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>4,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>7,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>1,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scotland’s Muslim population is more concentrated in particular ethnicities, though the community is still significantly diverse. In terms of understanding discrimination and racist violence, however, it is important to continue to use an intersectional approach, as the smaller communities of Black Muslims or White Muslims in Scotland may experience geographically particular forms of racialisation and discrimination.

Ethnicity of Muslims in Northern Ireland:
Northern Ireland’s Muslim population is highly diverse despite being rather small, with 3,832 members in total. There is a relatively large proportion of white Muslims in the country as well as a relatively large African Muslim community and Mixed-ethnicity Muslim community.

Countries of origin

The majority of Muslims in England and Wales are born in the UK. This indicates that many Muslims identify with a British identity. More important is also that research shows that second-generation Muslims do not experience less discrimination than previous generations despite having more qualifications and better language skills. This is explored in depth in following sections.

Country of birth of Muslims in England and Wales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>646,084</td>
<td>632,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>1,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>84,240</td>
<td>78,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>141,788</td>
<td>134,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and Asia</td>
<td>530,885</td>
<td>446,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas and the Caribbean</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>4,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Antarctica, Oceania (including Australasia) and other 492 482

Country of birth of Muslims in Scotland:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin</th>
<th>Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>5,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>28,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other UK</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and Asia</td>
<td>31,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas and the Caribbean</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antarctica and Oceania and Other</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Temperature test

This section explores the attitudes held by Muslim women and attitudes held about them. The media in particular is crucial in framing public attitudes and debates about Muslim women. The Leveson Inquiry found that the press frequently reports in a way that damages the credibility of Muslims and other minority groups. In politics, while debates to ‘ban the burqa’ continue to be discussed these is more or less limited to the far-right. While there are positive developments in politics in terms of addressing hate crime, it is unlikely that political pressure will be put on firms to implement crucial equalities monitoring.

The primary challenge are the growing sentiments and prejudice that inform social attitudes that cast Muslims in a negative light. This is primarily a consequence of biased media reporting that has been the subject of a significant amount of studies reported below. Finally, this section reviews opinion polls to gauge the perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims about discrimination and Islamophobia.

3.1 Media

A large body of research has explored Muslims in the media in the last two decades. Two key sources explore large corpora of words used in articles as primary sources for critical discourse analysis. A majority of this work has focused on Muslims in general, highlighting how British Muslims have overwhelmingly been represented through frames around radicalisation, cultural difference, and terrorism (see Baker et. al. 2013, Poole 2009, Moore et. al. 2008). Further, the representation of Muslims abroad through frames of war and conflict further impact Muslims domestically (see al-Heijn 2015, for example).

British Muslim women have primarily been explored in the media through frames around the veil, with the ‘Jack Straw’ veil controversy which focused on Muslim women whose faces were covered by different veiling practices (see al-Heijn 2015, Baker et. al. 2015, Dwyer et. al. 1999). The niqab, burqa and other veiling practices that cover the face are seen as ““passive” forms of radicalisation’ or are interpreted through a frame of imposition (Baker et. al. 2013, 201-204). In particular, full-face veiling is seen as fundamentally ‘other’ to ‘Britishness’, incompatible with
modern liberal society, and presents specific threats to counter-terrorism policing (Dwyer et. al. 1999, 105).

According to Elizabeth Poole, this debate is also often framed through the question of freedoms denied to women by ‘demands’ to wear the veil, essentially denying a sense of choice and agency when Muslim women are represented in the press (Poole 2009, 112). This is further corroborated by Bandar al-Hejin who demonstrates that representation of Muslim women in geographies of war (in areas including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) refers to them through frames of victimisation and precarity, limiting the sense of agency that they are provided in articles by the BBC (al-Hejin 2015, 29). Further, this work corroborates other claims that the veil is viewed as a security concern because it conceals the wearer’s identity, frames it as an imposition, and when viewed positively, is understood through a rights-based discourse. All the same, Baker et. al. comment that the ‘general position of the British press towards veiling is ambivalent and conflicted’ (2013, 219).

The 1997 report by the Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all*, opened public discussion on Islamophobia, defining it as “the shorthand way of referring to the dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (in Allen 2011, 52). Allen (2012), drawing on Moore, et. al. (2008), show that reporting on Islam and Muslims was produced primarily through frames around terrorism and reports of religious difference (2012, 8-9). The frames of terrorism and the war on terror, religious and cultural differences (such as halal meat preferences), and extremist Muslims animated the majority (69 per cent) of news hooks referencing Muslims (Moore et. al. 2008, 10). A recent longitudinal study shows similar results, with Muslims being portrayed overwhelmingly in negative frames and rarely in a positive light (Baker et. al. 2013).

The media is the principal source of information for educating the broader public about Islam. In fact, a YouGov poll finds that 74 per cent of the British public claim that they know nothing or next to nothing about Islam and 64 per cent get their information about Islam through the media (Allen 2013, 2). The Leveson Inquiry also notes that ‘the press can have significant influence over community relations’ and that ‘discriminatory, sensational or unbalanced reporting…is a feature of journalistic practice, rather than an aberration’ (Leveson Inquiry in Allen 2013, APPG, 3). Allen argues that the ‘ideological component’ of Islamophobia is informed by the media, ‘reinforced through messages and meanings from the social, political and cultural
spaces…all have the potential to contribute to the process of stigmatization, marginalization and intolerance’ (2013, 7). In a study of attacks on Muslim women, it was ‘society’s misunderstandings’ that, ‘for them…was attributable to the media and the way in which Muslims are represented’ (Allen et al n.d. 25).

3.2 Political spaces

Though issues around policing and counter-terrorism tend to affect men more frequently than women with men being stereotyped for terrorism more so than women, Muslim women are still impacted by counter-terrorism strategies. Recent research shows that Muslim women have been approached through the Prevent counter-terrorism programme as a ‘silent’ majority, with policy assuming that Muslim women [are] victims solely of ‘pathological Muslim patriarchy’ rather [than] victims of deprived socio-economic conditions, citizenship uncertainties, or patriarchy and racism in wider society. Attempts to engage, empower and give voice to Muslim women reflect this problematic characterization (Rashid 2014, 601).

While policy makers seem to be reaching out to women to speak out and counter radicalisation, this actually reflects a series of misguided, gendered assumptions about Muslim women. This is criticised as a top-down approach with ‘Muslim women were nurtured to act as the mouthpiece of government by appealing to a secular and a human rights agenda with clear anti-terrorist sentiments’ (Allen and Guru 2012).

Though counter-terrorism policing has viewed Muslim women through dated stereotypes about Muslim women’s oppression (see Abu-Lughod 2002 for a seminal study) and through top-down approaches, there has been some movement on hate crime policing that may have a positive effect on Muslim women. Both the Conservative government and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London (MOPAC) have drafted new hate crime strategies (HM Government 2014, Mayor of London Office of Policing and Crime 2014). Teresa May, Home Secretary and responsible for delivery both of counter-terrorism and hate crime policing, stated prior to the 2015 General Election, that the Conservative government ‘will require police forces to record anti-Muslim crimes as well as anti-Semitic crimes’ (Datoo 2015). This development is important particularly for Muslim women as they are slightly more affected by offline hate crimes.
The Conservative party’s 2015 General Election Manifesto also prioritised equality for disabled people and full gender equality (Conservative Party 2015, 19). In order to accomplish this, they will ‘push’ companies with more than 250 employees to publish the difference in average pay between male and female employees. However, the manifesto does not reference ethnic minorities in the workplace despite the sizable evidence base reviewed in section 2 of this report that clearly demonstrates that cuts to the public sector and slow uptake of equalities monitoring has led to significant gender, ethnicity-based, and religiously-based pay penalties.

3.3 Public opinion

Opinion polls have examined the issue of Muslims in the West extensively. Below, we explore these opinion polls and what they reveal about Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes to British society and the place of Muslims in British society. Gallup has done extensive research on issues pertaining to Muslim women. They find that 30 per cent of the British public believes that the hijab is a threat and that 16 per cent of the British public would not want a Muslim neighbour (Gallup n.d). Further, 36 per cent of the British public believe that ‘loyalty’ to the UK did not apply to British Muslims, though 82 per cent British Muslims surveyed did feel that loyalty applied (Gallup 2009, 20). While only 3 per cent of British Muslims felt that other religions pose a threat, 36 per cent of the British public felt that ‘other’ religions posed a threat (2009, 19).

The hijab was the subject of a number of questions in the Gallup Coexist Index. They found that 53 per cent of the British public feels it necessary to remove the face veil to integrate and 32 per cent said the same of the hijab. This was compared to 24 per cent saying the same about the yarmulke, 18 per cent about the turban, and 17 per cent about large crosses (Gallup 2009, 22), possibly demonstrating that secularism and atheism are significant values for the British public. While there is clearly a minority of the British public that is reticent to accept public displays of religiosity, it is telling that Muslim displays of religion are the most incompatible with a sense of ‘integration’.

The hijab and veiling practices are also associated with a variety of assumptions and stereotypes among the British public. 26 per cent of the British public associates it with fanaticism and 31 per cent associates it with oppression
(confirming some of the assumptions described in the section above on the media, Gallup 2009, 36). At the same time, 41 per cent of the British public associates the wearing of the hijab with ‘confidence’ and 37 per cent an enrichment to European culture (Gallup 2009, 37). However, a small minority, 26 per cent, view the hijab and veiling as a threat to European culture (2009, 37).

A Pew poll found that 24 per cent of the British had an ‘unfavourable’ view of Muslims in the country (Pew Research Center 2014, 31). Another report finds that 75 per cent of respondents felt that Islam is the most violent religion (Pew Research Center 2011, 23) and 43 per cent felt that Muslims are ‘fanatical’ (2011, 26). Further, this poll finds that only 24 per cent of the UK respondents felt that Muslims are respectful of women (2011, 27).

A recent poll commissioned by the BBC and conducted by ComRes looks at Muslim opinions of life in the UK. This is one of the few polls that disaggregates between male and female Muslim respondents. They find that 93 per cent of Muslims feel they should always obey British laws and 95 per cent feel a loyalty to Britain (ComRes 2015, 1). More alarming is that 40 per cent of female Muslim respondents feel that ‘most British people don’t trust Muslims’ while this is true only for 29 per cent of male Muslim respondents (ComRes 2015, 7). 48 per cent of females also felt that ‘Britain is becoming less tolerant of Muslims’ (ComRes 2015, 8). While 46 per cent of all Muslims felt that ‘prejudice against Islam makes it very difficult being a Muslim in Britain, 49 per cent of women felt this way (ComRes 2015, 9). 51 per cent of all Muslims surveyed felt that they disagreed with this statement, a slim majority (ComRes 2015, 9).

Most alarming is that Muslim women do not seem to enjoy as high a sense of security as do men Muslim men in the UK. When responding to the question, ‘I do not feel safe as a Muslim in Britain’, 19 per cent of Muslim women–almost one in five–agreed, whereas only 10 per cent of males agreed (ComRes 2015, 18). However, it is clear that Muslims are committed to a multicultural life in a diverse country: Only 11 per cent of Muslim women felt that they would rather socialise with only Muslims, with 87 per cent preferring to socialise with Muslims and non-Muslims (ComRes 2015, 28).

What the opinion polls make clear is that there continue to be significant challenges to Muslim women in the United Kingdom, particularly in ensuring that they feel more comfortable in everyday life and more secure as British citizens. That
one in five Muslim women do not feel safe is a disturbing number. Further, the minorities of the British public that do feel that the hijab and veiling practices are oppressive, fanatical, or threatening are problematic, but the polls show that large portions of the British public are tolerant. The fact that an overwhelming majority of Muslims express loyalty to Britain shows that despite the problems that must be tackled, Muslim women are deeply committed to contributing to and benefitting from British society.
4. Employment

Muslim women face multiple forms of discrimination when searching for employment, in career progression, and in gender-based pay equity. Muslim women are often subject to ‘multiple discrimination’, penalising them on the grounds of ethnicity, religious expression, and gender. The studies reviewed below demonstrate how this ‘multiple discrimination’ is a composition of gender-based, ethnic, and religious factors.

These factors include pay inequality due to ethnic and religious difference, described in academic literature as an ‘ethnic penalty’ in the labour market. Further forms of direct and indirect discrimination that affect Muslim women emerge at recruitment and application stages, where stereotypes about Muslim women make employers less likely to take them as serious candidates. Discrimination is experienced as direct discrimination in the forms of unequal pay, and impediments to securing employment and indirect discrimination experienced as difficulty in fitting into a workplace culture and climbing the career ladder.

4.2 Formal data

Employment/labour market data

Numerous quantitative studies demonstrate clearly that BME workers face significant gaps in pay equality. However, not all BME workers face the same inequalities (Metcalf 2009, 35): Jewish, Indian, and Chinese minority ethnicities have significantly less acute penalties than Black, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi minorities (Metcalf 2009, 36, Longhi and Platt 2008).

Pay penalties are also different based on gender. In comparison to white British men, white women endure a pay gap of 16 per cent, Indian women 14 per cent, Chinese 9 per cent, and Black Caribbean women a gap of 14 per cent. Women of these ethnicities are better-off than white women in this regard (Longhi and Platt 2008 in Metcalf 2009, 37). Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Black African women face penalties between 18 and 26 per cent (Longhi and Platt 2008 in Metcalf 2009, 37). These ethnic groups have a much higher proportion of Muslims (though Black Africans have a diverse set of religions within this rather large ethnic grouping). Based on
2001-2004 Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, Anthony Heath and Sin Yi Cheung demonstrate that ‘African, Caribbean, Black Mixed, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women all experience very substantial ethnic penalties’ with regards to unemployment (2006, 23). Heath and Cheung also find that second-generation ethnic minorities do not fare significantly better than their parents (2006, 22). Clark and Drinkwater (2007) find similar results to Heath and Cheung (2006), demonstrating that Black African, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi women experience the highest levels of pay penalties when compared to white women (see Clark and Drinkwater 2007, 42-43). Based on different datasets (as opposed to the Labour Force Survey), Nandi and Platt (2010) found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi women have significantly lower individual incomes than white British women, where Black Caribbean and Black African women have relative parity with white British women (2010, 37).

Discussion of a specifically ‘Muslim penalty’ in the labour market began with Brown (2000) who used econometric analysis to demonstrate that a ‘direct effect may be at work in the form of religious discrimination…in particular [because]…Muslims (and Islam) are increasingly experiencing a negative profile within the British media and society at large’ (Brown 2000, 1059). Lindley’s (2002) seminal study on Muslims in the labour market arrives at similar conclusions to Brown (2000). She finds that women’s non-activity in the labour market is a ‘direct result of Islamic faith, relative to other religious groups’ (2002, 438).

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that a large proportion of Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are economically inactive (Longhi and Platt 2008, 9) and the conscious decision not to work should be taken into account. Berthoud and Blekesaune (2007) controlled for women’s family positions and found that employment gaps existed by 27 to 31 per cent, suggesting that ‘Pakistani and Bangladeshi women’s disadvantage is not explained just by the fact that so many of them have young children’ (2007, 28). Studies of British Muslim women have found that 60 per cent of women who were not in work had worked previously, and only 47 per cent of them had left work to have children (Bunglawala 2008, 56).

Peach (2006) associates this lack of participation as a particularly Muslim issue, but Khattab (2012) shatters this perception, showing that in fact labour market participation varies by ethnic group within Muslim communities by using the same data (2001 Census). Khattab (2012) finds that there are some ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on the ethnicity of Muslims. This is due to varied migration histories and differential patterns of settlement in Britain (2012, 557).
controlling for qualification, it becomes clear that when Muslim women do look for jobs with academic qualifications, they are still less likely to find a job (though this is more acute for Muslim men, Khattab 2009, 314).

Muslim women do have high rates of inactivity in the economy, and it remains to be understood why this is the case despite changing trends (Heath and Martin 2013, 1019). We might speculate that part of this involves a hesitation to engage in the labour market due to the fact that ‘there is a consistent pattern for Muslim men and women to experience greater labour market penalties than their co-ethnics who belong to other (or no) religions’ (2013, 1024). Khattab and Johnston (2014) provide the most recent and most comprehensive study of Muslim women’s labour market penalties. Finding that most ethnic minorities face penalties, they demonstrate that Muslim penalties are the most acute and (as their previous (2013) research shows) adds on to ethnic penalties. Their research focuses on the penalties applied to Muslims of various ethnicities in accessing the salariat, the class Heath and Cheung (2006) associate with secure, well-paid, managerial level employment. Khattab and Johnston find clear evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’, demonstrating that unlike Hindu Indians who are almost 1.49 times as likely as a white British Christian to access the salariat, Muslim Indians are 0.86 times as likely to acquire such a job. Similarly, white Muslims are approximately 0.72 times as likely as a white Christian or non-religious woman to access the salariat and the odds for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are significantly worse (2014, 8).

In examining how ethnicity, religion, and deprivation affects returns on education, Khattab et al. (2012) find that labour market disadvantages suggest both ‘colour and cultural-racism’ (2012, 307). They found that severely overqualified groups were all non-white, suggesting that even with high qualifications, ethnic minorities do not necessarily see returns from their studies in the labour market (2012, 306). Khattab et al.’s (2012) findings are corroborated by Rafferty (2012) who finds that ethnic gaps continue to exist:

Black African and Pakistani/Bangladeshi women and men with graduate level qualifications were among the least likely to work in graduate jobs. Around 37.7 per cent of Black African women and 36.4 per cent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi women with higher level qualifications worked in non-graduate occupations compared to 24 per cent of white UK born women (2012, 995).

University education is celebrated as a route to better labour market outcomes and increased likelihood of job security and occupational fulfillment, but research on overqualification shows that despite high education, ethnic minorities are less likely to find challenging and fulfilling
positions commensurate with their drive, motivation, and qualifications (see also Battu and Sloane 2004).

A degree—typically the route to a secure, professional occupation—is not necessarily a guarantee of success. In fact, with the exception of ethnic Indians, Muslim women with degrees have a lower likelihood to attain a job commensurate with their qualifications than their White British Christian counterparts (Khattab and Johnston 2014, 9-10). ‘Muslims experience the greatest penalties with regard to securing employment – especially Muslim women’ (Khattab and Johnston 2014, 11). It stands to reason that Islamophobia and growing anxieties towards Muslims in the UK and the West more generally are negatively affecting Muslim women’s ability to access equal employment, compounding ethnic and gender discrimination. In the workplace, this is due to a particular form of stereotyping of Muslim women that reiterates outdated assumptions about their gender roles, work ethic, and life aspirations.

*Public and private sectors [includes informal data]*

Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 establishes an ‘equality duty’ which stipulates that public authorities must have ‘due regard’ for the eliminating discrimination, harassment, victimisation or any other conduct prohibited in the Act, to advance equality of opportunity between individuals belonging to a group with a protected characteristic and those without and to foster good relations between different groups. Under this duty, public bodies are required to set and publish equality objectives every four years and demonstrate compliance with the equality duty by publishing information, including information regarding employees and policies. The public sector equality duty (PSED) can be enforced by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and through Judicial Review.

While the public sector has done a better job in ensuring equalities due to the public sector equality duty, there are also improvements in the area to be made. According to Race for Opportunity, the top five public sector organisations for race (employing BME individuals) are the BBC, Circle Housing Group, Environment Agency, Genesis Housing Association, and the Home Office (Race for Opportunity 2014).

The private sector, however, has not made much progress in this area according to the Workplace Employment Relations Study (2013), which has made little change in monitoring and
implementing measures to counter inequality. According to the study ‘practice had not changed since 2004’, with most workplaces not implementing any measures around monitoring recruitment, promotions, and pay rates (van Wanrooy 2013, p 35). Only one in four workplaces at best took any action around discrimination and equalities. However, the situation is not dire: Race for Opportunity (RfO), which encourages employers to contribute information and receive equalities guidance, finds that some workplaces have done an excellent job in equalities monitoring, in the past and in 2014. They list the five best private sector workplaces for race equality: Accenture, British Telecom plc, Enterprise Rent-A-Car, EY, and KPMG LLP (Race for Opportunity 2014). Of their member employers, 60 per cent had a business case for racial equality and 84 per cent had a diversity strategy but only 48 per cent had published it in the public domain (Race for Opportunity 2014b, 3). This group of members is self-selecting and is not representative of the private sector as a whole, but the RfO highlights a few good practices that lead to better equality for BME employees and job applicants. Organisations where the rate of conversion from applying to being hired is similar between BAME and white candidates do the following: target diverse candidates at recruitment fairs, mandate unconscious bias training during recruitment, ensure ethnically diverse recruitment panels, [and] use a variety of recruitment sources to attract a wider pool of applicants (2014b, 3).

While the WERS 2011 demonstrates clearly that many employers need to take further steps on racial equality in the workplace, there are a number of good practices in organisations highlighted by RfO that have enabled better equality at various stages. Structural changes, such as having a business case for diversity, targeting diversity and ensuring training on diversity issues, and reaching out to various sources for recruitment can have a clear impact in ensuring parity between white and BME applicants. While particular stereotypes about Islam and Muslims do play a role, initiating such equalities measures can have a positive impact. Other measures, such as the National Equality Standard, can be another self-regulatory mechanism for organisations to ensure equality and diversity in the workplace. As the Department of Business Innovation and skills points out, there is a business case for ethnic diversity in the workplace: research done in the United States ‘finds positive correlations between board-level and workforce ethnic diversity’ and British FTSE 100 firms have ‘suggested an “association” between the total value of a company’s stock and appointment of directors from Minority and Ethnic backgrounds’ (BIS 2013, 18).
Muslim women are a growing demographic in the ranks of the labour market. They are increasingly highly qualified and determined to balance the intense demands of work with their desires to raise strong, secure families. Though the challenges of unequal pay and direct and indirect discrimination impede their ability to contribute equally in the labour market, better guidance and stricter adherence to equalities guidelines in the private and public sectors can make a difference. Given that Muslims are a growing population in the UK—over two million Brits today are Muslim—their role in the labour market cannot be ignored. Given the growing number of well-qualified Muslims in Britain, they represent an excellent pool of labour and a crucial market for consuming private sector goods. In short, it would be a mistake to fail to include Muslim women in the labour market; taking equalities seriously and shattering stereotypes about Muslims women should be a priority for the public and private sectors.

_Discrimination in the workplace_

An increasing percentage of people felt that they had been refused promotion or career progression on grounds of religion or belief, though the number is reduced by 2009. This is still a relatively low proportion of people, ranging over that period from 1 to 3 per cent. At the same time, the same volume of employment tribunal cases over the same time period has increased dramatically (Weller 2011, 31).

According to the evidence, along with Black African and Black Caribbean individuals, Pakistani and Bangladeshi applicants and employees are clearly discriminated against by employers at the application stage. In order to judge this level of access to employment, a Department for Work and Pensions study submitted three closely matched applications to a number of job adverts in different industries across the UK, differentiating the applications based on names representative of various ethnic communities (Wood, et al. 2009a, 12). The study found that ethnic minority applicants had to send 74 per cent more applications than their white counterparts to achieve an equal level of success (Wood, et al. 2009b, 3). Further, it noted that across all ethnic groups that a factor of discrimination exists by more than 20 per cent (but it suggests that differences between ethnic groups are not statistically significant, Wood, et al. 2009a, 36).
There is evidence of discrimination both in high-level positions (such as management, technical positions, and teaching), though levels of discrimination may be higher in lower-level positions (support, routine production, administration and carers) despite the fact that the authors claim that the difference is not statistically significant (Wood, et al. 2009a, 38).

While it is clear that ethnic names on CVs between closely matched applicants result in a significant level of discrimination, there is one positive finding: the public sector has a significantly lower level of discrimination than the private sector, where the penalties are 4 per cent and 35 per cent respectively (Wood, et al. 2009a, 39). This suggests that the public sector is an example of excellent practice in rooting out discrimination at the application stage.

Recruitment centres that help service users find jobs, such as JobCentre Plus, developed specifically to address shortfalls in employment, may not serve BME individuals as well as they should.

Though it is clear that satisfaction with the service is mixed, there is some evidence that while there are not significant levels of dissatisfaction in particular ethnic groups when compared to white groups, though it appears that black users of the JobCentre Plus do have a lower level of overall satisfaction (Johnson and Fidler 2006, 84, Hudson, et al. 2006). This is particularly worrying considering that, per capita, black and ‘other’ ethnic minorities claim the most in Jobseeker’s Allowance (see below, Figure JSA Claimants). It would be irresponsible to dismiss this particular figure due to ‘cultural’ factors. Rather, this might be because of structural issues in JobCentre Plus and other unemployment services.

While advisers have been criticised for gaps in ‘cultural understanding’ for South Asians, they are reported to be respectful of religious and cultural difference (2006, 91). While there is positive response, other South Asians felt that cultural understanding among JobCentre advisers was ‘surface level’ (2006, 91). Advisers are aware of issues such as time taken off for daily and Friday prayers, Ramadan, and Eid celebrations and treat these fairly, comparing them to commitments such as childcare and non-religious requirements (2006, 90).

However, there seems to be a consensus that part of the trouble facing ethnic minorities using services like JobCentre Plus is discrimination by employers (Hudson et. al. 2006, 112-113). Advisers are well aware of this (2006, 114) where employers would shy away from Somalian candidates because (according to the employer) ‘they pray’ and have ‘too much [sic] problems’ (2006, 115). In order to counter this, advisers would avoid mentioning a name that
sounds like that of an ethnic minority, trying to “sell” the client before mentioning their name’ (2006, 118).

Pakistani and Bangladeshi women face consistently low levels of employment (Bell and Casebourne 2008, 4), but this is resolutely not because of their unwillingness to work due to ‘cultural commitments’ that are purportedly due to strict divisions of household labour around gender roles (Tackey, et al. 2006). Studies clearly demonstrate that Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Black Caribbean girls expect to combine family and career at a proportion almost the same as their white counterparts (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006, 7). This is corroborated by data that shows fewer second generation Pakistanis in particular believe that women should stay at home while husbands go to work (Heath and Demireva 2014, 170).

BME women also face significant discrimination at high-level roles, limiting their access to stable, salaried positions despite their qualifications. Based on applications for roles in Human Resources management, research found that there was a factor of discrimination by 63 per cent, one of the most senior roles tested for in the study (Wood, et al. 2009a, 39).

**Historical trends and changes**

A number of further studies show that into 2015, the picture has not changed significantly: ethnic minority men and women continue to face significant pay penalties. Indeed, even when ethnic minorities do find jobs that match their qualifications, ethnic penalties persist. Over time, minorities have made large gains in the number of GCSEs obtained (see Rothon 2005 in Heath and Cheung 2006, 30) and it is clear that their positions have improved somewhat over time.

Through the end of the 20th century, Heath and Cheung (2006) find that large ethnic penalties have persisted since 1973 (though their figures indicate some decrease), but for Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, over this time period ‘it would be safest to conclude that there has been no real change’ due to the statistical margins of error (2006, 30-31).

Khattab and Johnston’s (2014) analysis of 2002-2010 data corroborates the earlier study completed by Lindley (2002) that reviews data collected from 1994, suggesting that in fact Muslim penalties have been a problem in the British labour market for decades and is a pressing concern for equality in British society.
Cheung (2014) finds that a substantial ‘Muslim penalty’ persists for Muslim women compared to Christians even after controlling for generational progress, suggesting that structural problems in recruitment persist over time. This is despite findings that show demonstrable dynamism within Muslim communities, showing that Pakistani women and Bangladeshi women are much more likely to participate in the labour market if they are UK born (Georgiadis and Manning 2011, 558).

Based on recent studies, it is clear that despite the increasing policy focus on countering inequality in the workplace, workplaces had done little to monitor equalities over the period 2004 to 2011. In fact, there has been little change in this regard since 2004 (van Wanrooy et. al. 2013, 31). Rather, equality measures to attract job applicants from ethnic minority communities reduced by 3 per cent over 2004 to 2011 down to a meager 5 per cent from 8 per cent of all workplaces in 2004 (van Wanrooy et. al. 2013, 31). This suggests that findings from studies mentioned above that a lack of job applicants might reflect the narrow advertising mechanisms these employers used. It appears that an agenda for narrowing equalities gaps in recruitment have not been taken seriously by employers; in fact, religion and sexual orientation were two equalities areas that employers did not focus on heavily. The only equalities strand that saw a level of parity between 2004 and 2011 was disability (2013, 31).

4.2 Informal data

**Employment/labour market data**

The most prescient issue regarding discrimination in the workplace refers to widespread misconceptions about religious dress that Muslim women experience. In fact, 43 per cent of women surveyed felt they ‘were treated differently or encountered discrimination at interviews because they were Muslim’ (Bunglawala 2008, 7). This has been corroborated by research in the United States that demonstrates that Islamic clothing is a disadvantage in interviews and when searching for a job (Ghumman and Jackson 2010) and anecdotally in the UK (BBC News 2013). Zamila Bunglawala (2008) has conducted deep research into the multiple ways that Muslim women are disadvantaged in the labour market. Overwhelmingly, the reasons given are more or less consistent with the issues around stereotyping for ethnic minorities described above. Candidates are ‘rejected at the first stage of a job application for having a Muslim name’ and
employers hold Islamophobic stereotypes (2008, 63). Other factors include the lack of women-only work environments that might cater to some Muslim women’s needs (though these preferences are changing) and the possibility that some recruitment centres hold stereotypes about Muslim women and do not put them forward for jobs. In fact, Race for Opportunity finds that there is a relatively higher equality of positive outcome when BME and white applicants apply directly to an employer for the same job, whereas the recruitment industry places 44 per cent of whites in jobs while only placing 29 per cent in jobs for BME applicants (Business in the Community, n.d.).

While employers, when surveyed, do seem to affirm a certain level of equality and appreciation of ethnic minorities, some employment penalties occur in the interview stage itself. In particular, competency in English is a major barrier for foreign-born ethnic minorities and presenting themselves in a way that impressed candidates (Roberts and Campbell 2006, 149). Ethnic minorities may not be completely familiar with the ‘unwritten, implicit and culturally specific rules’ that might engender some form of indirect discrimination (as ethnic minorities may have different forms of cultural capital) and while they may be alleviated by more diverse panels on the employer-side in interviews, this does not necessarily mitigate this issue (2006, 151). Part of this involves the responsibility of interviewers: for example, where misunderstandings arise, this should not be considered solely due to poor English (perhaps the interviewer may have worded a question incorrectly) or questions could be made more informative (Roberts and Campbell 2006, 167-8). Also, interviewers should expect to have answers in different narratives than they expect, particularly with candidates from non-white backgrounds, and this should be taken into consideration when evaluating applicants (2006, 168).

According to Race for Opportunity, 40 per cent of Muslim women (as identified by Bangladeshi or Pakistani identity) ‘reported that they believe the clothes they wear for religious reasons shaped the way in which they are seen, with assumptions being made’ (2012, 4). The hijab in particular impeded Muslim women in interviews. Research demonstrated that ‘some Muslim women who removed their hijab for interviews were successful in getting a job, having worn their hijab to previous interviews and being unsuccessful’ (Butler 2012, 13). Further, 50 per cent of women wearing the hijab felt they had ‘missed out on progression opportunities because of religious discrimination and that the wearing of the hijab had been a
factor’ (Bunglawala 2008, 7, see also Dale et al. 2002 in Khattab 2009). Another impediment to career advancement for Muslim women is the availability of culturally appropriate childcare as Muslim women are significantly more likely to rely on informal networks to sort out childcare and might be reluctant to use paid childcare services (2008, 57).

**Discrimination in the workplace**

Misguided stereotypes about the life aspirations of BME and particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi women have a major impact: a striking one in eight Pakistani women are asked about marriage and family aspirations in job interviews whereas only one in thirty white women are asked such a question (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006, 17, see also Butler 2012, 13, Hudson and Radu 2011, 8). This is clear evidence that employers assume that Pakistani women will conform to an entirely imagined gender role based on their ethnic (and religious) identity. In fact, 26 per cent of employers noted difficulties with hiring Black or Asian women because they were worried that they were ‘more likely to leave because of pressure from their families’ (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006, 35). Again, this corroborates suspicions that employers hold significant, false stereotypes about BME women, their communities, and their attitudes to work. At high-levels of qualifications, Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are the most likely to remain unemployed (2006, 26).

When competing for high-level management positions, BME women are likely to hit a ‘lower glass ceiling’: 11 per cent of white women are in managerial roles, while Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are represented at 6 per cent and 9 per cent respectively (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006, 29); this suggests that employers penalise Pakistani and Bangladeshi women over a perception that they will prioritise family over work and are not capable of balancing the two.

Further, many Asian women felt that senior leadership positions were ‘indirectly’ unavailable to women with childcare responsibilities: despite BME women having strong career and family aspirations, they are penalised for not prioritising only their careers (Race for Opportunity 2012). Pakistani and Bangladeshi women with high qualifications are much less likely to stay out of the labour market than less-educated ones, but ‘maternal care for children is still seen as a priority, even amongst the most educated group’ (Dale, Lindley and Dex 2006,
336); however, all mothers, including Muslim women, should not be penalised for seeking balance between family and career ambitions.

Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals, due to strong kinship support networks, have particular experiences of ‘economic inactivity’—a term that might in fact be misleading. Some of them have a stigma about claiming benefits, feeling a ‘reluctance to take what was seen as being “charity”’ and misunderstandings about the impacts of taking Jobseeker’s Allowance (Tackey et al. 2006, 101). Other issues include a lack of ability in navigating such things as opening bank accounts and applying for jobseeker’s assistance (2006, 101).

More evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’ exists as well in terms of workplace cohesion. For example, the common practice of going to the pub after work for drinks inevitably excludes Muslims and is perceived by some as an impediment to networking in the workplace and developing the necessary relations required to advance a career (Butler 2012, 14).

In terms of career progression, BME women are at a disadvantage to white women. Only 20 per cent of the former receive help in career advancement from line managers whereas 75 per cent of white women found mentors, supervisors, sponsors and coaches that helped them push ahead (Race for Opportunity 2012, 6).

**Historical trends and changes**

It is important to tackle the misconceptions that employers might hold about Muslim women that have developed over time; in fact ‘a recent MORI survey found many people thought unemployed Pakistani and Bangladeshi women face cultural and religious barriers that prevent them from working’ and such attitudes affect the notions that employers hold (Bunglawala 2008, 54). These stereotypes are resolutely inaccurate: in fact, many Pakistanis interviewed in qualitative studies in the most recent generations expressed that education is a priority for them and a quality employment is an important motivation for women, providing security, status, and social mobility (Shah et al. 2010, 1115-20). Pakistani girls have high aspirations, outperforming males from their community (Shah et al. 2010, 1120; Dwyer and Shah 2009). ‘Peer group structures’ are important for ‘dispositions’ to education and work and in fact, young women’s peer culture ‘[supports] and [encourages] study in most cases’ (Shah et al. 2010, 1121, see also Bagguley and Hussain 2014).
4.3 Legislation, policies, and case law

Since 2010, the UK has taken important legislative steps to address discrimination and equalities in employment. The Equality Act 2010 is the key law, superseding previous laws such as the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) and (Religion) Regulations 2003. The Equality Action 2010 'prohibits unlawful harassment, victimisation and direct and indirect discrimination at work based on religion and belief' (Equalities and Human Rights Commission 2014, 3). Further, it is the duty of public authorities to eliminate prohibited conduct in a range of protected characteristics: ‘age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, [and] sexual orientation’ (Equalities Act 2010 c. 15, Part 2, Ch. 1, Clause 4).

In relation to the European Convention of Human Rights, Articles 9 and 14 have the most relevance to employment discrimination. Article 9 establishes the individual’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This includes the ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief’ that is proscribed by ‘law’ and ‘are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the freedoms of others’ (Article 9, Clause 2). Article 14 effectively prohibits discrimination against protected characteristics. While there is some interpretive space here, case law has established that there are points where freedom to manifest religion can be proscribed by employers when reasonable and proportional. However, there are points where employees feel discriminated against and this has led, in the UK, to a large proportion of Muslims utilising employment tribunal advice and claims.

An important distinction refers to direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination involves a conscious, deliberate decision:

Examples of direct discrimination include dismissing someone because of a protected characteristic, deciding not to employ them, refusing them training, denying them a promotion, or giving them adverse terms and conditions all because of a protected characteristic (Acas 2013).

Direct discrimination is a strong claim and is clearly unlawful. Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, can be lawful.

Indirect discrimination occurs when ‘when an organisation's practices, policies or procedures have the effect of disadvantaging people who share certain protected characteristics’ (Acas 2013). Indirect discrimination can be lawful if there is an ‘objective justification’,
demonstrating a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. This indirect discrimination should be proportionate, it might, for example, include the economic needs of running a business, and there must be no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative (Acas 2013). Indirect discrimination, as the case law below will demonstrate, is an area of particular relevance to Muslim women.

The most cited case around religious discrimination in the workplace is Eweida v British Airways plc, where a ‘claimant was sent home from work without pay following repeated infringements of her employer’s uniform policy by attending work wearing a visible Christian cross’ (Maher 2014, 3). She claimed that, while British Airways would allow Muslim women to wear the hijab, it was a form of direct and indirect discrimination to send her home from work for visibly wearing a crucifix. This case has particular relevance to the issue of indirect discrimination because Eweida, the claimant, argued that it was necessary to manifest her religion by wearing a crucifix necklace in an employment tribunal. The tribunal found, however, according to the Regulations (Employment Equality Sexual Orientation and Religion Regulations 2003) that her claim of indirect discrimination failed because it was her own belief that it was a requirement to manifest the cross visibly and did not disadvantage Christians as a whole (Vickers 2009, 198).

A similar case is often addressed in relation to Eweida that refers specifically to a Muslim woman. In Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, a teaching assistant wanted to wear a niqab in the classroom when with a male teacher, claiming that her suspension for refusing to remove the veil was direct discrimination. The Employment Appeal Tribunal found instead that the treatment was indirectly discriminatory (Pitt 2011, 393), disadvantaging her as a Muslim. However, the appeal also found that the discrimination was proportionate as the children needed to see her face in order to get the best quality education (Vickers 2010, 287). This decision has ‘far-reaching’ effect because ‘it means that most of the cases involving religious dress as well as those involving time off for religious observance are dealt with as cases of indirect discrimination. This means that their success of otherwise will depend on the courts’ view of proportionality’ (2010, 287).

It has been argued that comparatively, the United Kingdom has a relatively weak protection of the freedom of religion compared to other EU countries. This is due to the litigation strategies stemming from the R. (on the application of Begum) v Denbigh High School
Governors case where a student refused to comply with her school’s dress code (which was shalwar kameez with an optional hijab) and was suspended from school for wearing a jilbab. The House of Lords, which heard the case, argued that Article 9 was engaged but her suspension from school ‘did not amount to an interference with her right to manifest her religious beliefs’ because she would not have any difficulty attending another school (Etherton 2014, 273). Consequently, the decision to suspend the student was seen as proportional and not an unprotected form of discrimination. This reasoning has been carried over to other cases, including R. (on the application of X) v Headteachers and Governors of Y School in which a student wishing to wear a niqab was also unsuccessful due to the fact that she had been offered a place at another school. Thus, Begum has outlined a particular type of legal reasoning, ‘the most problematic consequence’ of which is that the approach demonstrates that ‘under the established case law of the courts in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to succeed with claims based on [Article 9]’ (Lock 2013, 664). Indeed, it is this reluctance to address Article 9, by instead looking to the ‘interpretation of statutory discrimination provisions’ in English courts (Maher 2014, 218). These cases (and others) ultimately ended in a legal case in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Eweida and others v UK, where the ECtHR decided that ‘it viewed the determination of Article 9 cases at an interference [as was the case with English courts] rather than proportionality stage to be unsatisfactory’ (Maher 2014, 213). With regards to the Eweida case, the ECtHR found that too much weight had been given to British Airways’ interest in projecting a certain corporate image (2014, 228). In effect, the ECtHR upheld a claim from Eweida and others against the UK: ‘ECtHR found that English courts had failed to strike a ‘fair balance’ in protecting Article 9: they had given too much weight to an employer’s concerns about its corporate image and not enough weight to the employee’s interest in expressing her religious convictions’ (Maher 2013). What this means for Muslim women is that the European Court of Human Rights, above the UK Government, upholds the notion that the right to manifest one’s religious belief cannot be circumscribed by an argument for projecting a ‘corporate image’. These cases, however, have been relatively exceptional and cover only the issue of the manifestation of religion.
5. Racist and gendered violence and speech

Muslim women in the United Kingdom experience multiple forms of Islamophobia, including racist verbal abuse, hate crime, and violence. Often women that are ‘visibly’ Muslim are most likely to be targeted: wearing the hijab, niqab or burqa increases the likelihood that a woman will be targeted for a hate crime (Chakraborti and Zempi 2012). This has been corroborated across Europe in various studies (Allen 2014, 137-138). In particular, the United Kingdom benefits from a large number of studies that focus on Muslim women’s identities, referencing experiences of racism (Allen 2014, 139, Dwyer 1999, Brown 2006, Green and Singleton 2007). In this section, we will review various datasets on anti-Muslim hate in order to identify the types of Islamophobia that Muslim women experience and spaces where they experience it.

Formal datasets reviewed are primarily published by the Home Office, the ministry responsible for oversight of policing and publishing data on policing. We use reported incidents from police force areas in England and Wales and the Crime Survey of England and Wales. Scotland also publishes statistics on racist incidents and this information will be reviewed. These formal datasets will then be contrasted with findings from data collected by civil society organisations dedicated to addressing and reporting on Islamophobia. While their numbers are much lower than those recorded by the police, these datasets offer insights through media monitoring and exploring the everyday aspects of Islamophobia.

5.1 Formal data

Formal data sources on Muslim women’s experience of Islamophobia are limited. Islamophobic or anti-Muslim crime has been recorded as a separate crime category only recently and in very few, mostly urban police force areas in England.

In all other areas, anti-Muslim hate crime is folded into ethnicity categories with varying specificity across police forces. This information is not reflected in national statistics, which only monitor specific ‘strands’ of hate crime: race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and transgender. Due to the relative dearth of detailed data on Muslim hate crime, it is not possible to disaggregate gender dynamics from the statistics on specific hate crime strands—information on racial or religious hate crimes is not broken down by gender.
This section reviews data on hate crimes published by the Home Office and other statutory institutions, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Organisation of National Statistics. Based on the following datasets, it is clear that a significant proportion of hate crimes are directed toward Muslims.

There are a few key data points based on information compiled by the Home Office based on the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW). The main finding is that Muslims report experiencing hate crime at a higher level than any other religion in England and Wales: 2.4 per cent of Muslims reported experiencing hate crime; the next highest proportion is 2.0 per cent of those reporting an ‘Other’ religion (Home Office et al. 2013a, 1.05), which would include Sikhs, for example, who are also impacted by misdirected anti-Muslim hate (Saner 2012). 1.8 per cent of individuals identifying as ‘Asian/Asian British’ reported experiencing hate crime, which is a proportion higher than any other ethnic group. In comparison, 1.2 per cent of individuals identifying as ‘Black/African/Caribbean/Black British’ and 1.4 per cent of individuals identifying as ‘Other ethnic group’ reported experiences of hate crime (Home Office et al. 2013a, 1.05). All the same, from 2007 to 2013, there has been an overall decrease in the proportion of Muslims reporting experiences of racially-motivated hate crime, from 2.7 per cent to 2.0 per cent when compared with other religions. Nevertheless, over this time period Muslims experienced racially-motivated hate crime in greater proportion than any other religious group in the UK (2013a, 1.13). When looking at religiously motivated hate crime over the same time period, data demonstrates an increase from 1.1 per cent to 1.7 per cent, a higher level of religiously motivated hate crime than that experienced by any other religious group (2013a, 1.14). It is evident from formal data on hate crime that Muslims are among the most common targets of racially and religiously motivated hate crimes.

In Scotland, Pakistanis are the most frequently targeted ethnic minority of racial hate crime (statistics on religion have not been published). Pakistanis are the victims of 23 per cent of racist incidents while white British, white Irish and ‘other’ white victims experience 38 per cent of racist incidents. The Asian and Muslim population of Scotland is much lower than in England, but is not negligible. The fact that Pakistanis are the most targeted ethnic minority in Scotland lends further credence to the notion that Muslims experience hate crime in large proportion when compared to other ethnicities.
While whites in Scotland experience 37 per cent of racist incidents, 96 per cent of perpetrators of all racist incidents are white as well. While the proportions in England and Wales are a bit different, white perpetrators are 85.1 per cent of the total number of perpetrators cautioned for racially or religiously aggravated offenses (Home Office et. al. 2013, 3.03).

Home Office data from the Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales provides a thorough examination of hate crime in 2013/2014 and gives information on trends from previous years. The Home Office monitors race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity hate crime strands. Anti-Muslim hate crimes are usually recorded under race or religion strands. Hate crimes are aggravated crimes and are measured as either personal or household (Home Office et. al. 2013b, Table 1). Based on the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) 60 per cent of all hate crimes are personal and 40 per cent are household. Since 2007, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>% breakdown (where known) 2012-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengladeshi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Black</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 8 Ethnic group of victims/complainers of racist incidents, Scotland, 2004-05 to 2012-13 (The Scottish Government 2013).
proportion of hate crimes reported to the police have decreased, falling to 40 per cent from 51 in 2007 (2013b, Table 2). In 2012/2013, 81.7 per cent of all hate crimes were recorded under the ‘racial’ strand and 3.6 per cent under ‘religious’ (calculated from 2013b, Table 3). When compared with CSEW perceptions of hate crime, an interesting trend is revealed. CSEW estimates that 55 per cent are ‘racial’ and 25 per cent are ‘religious’, but police records of hate crimes reflect 85 per cent under ‘racial’ strands and only 4 per cent under ‘religion’ (2013, Figure 5). This is an interesting discrepancy that might indicate that hate crime victims might perceive a crime that the police record as ‘racial’ to in fact be ‘religious’. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate is likely to be caught between these categories as anti-Muslim harassment often uses racially-aggravated words; for example, Moosavi (2014) finds that white converts wearing the hijab have been called ‘Paki’, demonstrating the overlapping categories Islamophobic hate applies to. Due to this overlap, this report covers data broken down by ethnicity and religion where possible.

The charts comparing race and religion hate crimes below demonstrate the distribution of offenses for each respective type of hate crime. We see that overwhelmingly, Public order offences are the most common, but criminal damage is significantly more common for religious hate crime. The fact that the numbers for violence against the person are relatively the same suggests that racial and religious hate crime have similar dimensions and that perpetrators (and as analysis of case studies will show) view Muslims through a ‘racialised’ lens.
In the table below, we see that religion hate crimes are recorded in much smaller proportion to race ones. An interesting correlation is evident in this data: the first four police force areas on this list that record the highest levels of racial and religious hate are incidentally areas with sizeable Muslim populations. These police forces do (as of April 2015) record anti-Muslim hate crime, but the numbers show that urban areas with large Muslim and BME populations face a significant level of racial and religious hate crime. However, the data is not broken down by religion and it is difficult to see what proportion Asians or Muslims constitute of these numbers (Home Office et. al. 2013a, 2.02).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police force area</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>35,885</td>
<td>1,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Police</td>
<td>9,383</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Manchester</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office et. al. 2013a, table 2.03
Formal data also presents alarming information about multiple incidents. Hate crime victims are more likely than other victims of crime to be victimised more than once in the previous year: 26 per cent of victims of personal hate crime and 36 per cent of victims of household hate crime were targeted multiple times (Home Office et. al. 2013b, Figure 2).

The Crime Survey of England and Wales provides a number of interesting data points that give an insight into the ethnicities and religions experiencing hate crime most frequently. Mixed, Asian, and Black British respondents to the survey experienced personal hate crime in equal proportion. However, Asians are the most likely to be victims of ‘all’ hate crime, which would include personal and household crimes, or were in a household that experienced a hate crime. Notably, Mixed and ‘Other’ ethnic groups experience hate crime at a level above 1 per cent as well. While this is not a huge proportion of all hate crimes, it is concerning that Asians are experiencing hate crimes at a level higher than others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Personal hate crime</th>
<th>All hate crime</th>
<th>All CSEW personal crime</th>
<th>All CSEW crime</th>
<th>Unweighted base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>73,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>6,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/Multiple</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Asian British</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African/Caribbean/Black</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.05 (Home Office et. al. 2013a)
Looking at experiences of religious hate crime, however, tells a different story. Muslims are more likely to be targets of crime than Christians, as with members of ‘Other’ religions and ‘No religion’. Muslims are twice as likely as Hindus and more likely than any other religion to be victims of ‘all’ hate crime. This shows that Muslim respondents to the Crime Survey were more likely to have experienced or be in a household that has experienced a hate crime. However, it is crucial to note that these levels of hate crime are close to those experienced by other groups and consequently, anti-Muslim hate crime should be understood in context with a wide range of forms of hate, including disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity strands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Personal hate crime</th>
<th>All hate crime</th>
<th>All CSEW personal crime</th>
<th>All CSEW crime</th>
<th>Unweighted base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>57,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>2,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18,603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.05 (2013a)

Muslim respondents to CSEW reported hate crimes that are categorised under the ‘racial’ strand in the highest proportion. Of adults (16+) that experienced racially motivated hate crime in 2011-2013, 2 per cent were Muslim and 1.2 per cent belonged to an ‘Other’ religion (which includes Judaism and Sikhism). Given that police record racial hate crimes more frequently than religious ones, the indication that Muslims experience a large proportion of racial hate gives credence to the notion that Islamophobia manifests as racial and religious hate crime (Home Office et. al. 2013a, 1.13).

Muslim respondents (over the same time period) are also three times as likely as any other religious category to have experienced religiously motivated hate crime. While these numbers are only indicative, it shows that people identifying with an Islamic faith experience racially and religiously motivated hate crime more frequently than those of other faiths.
Table 1.13: Percentage of adults aged 16 and over who were victims of racially motivated hate crime, by ethnic group and religion, 2007/08 and 2008/09 to 2011/12 and 2012/13 (Home Office et. al 2013a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unweighted base</td>
<td>Unweighted base</td>
<td>Unweighted base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All racially</td>
<td>All racially</td>
<td>All racially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivated hate</td>
<td>motivated hate</td>
<td>motivated hate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crime</td>
<td>crime</td>
<td>crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crime^2</td>
<td>crime^2</td>
<td>crime^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group^2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86,628</td>
<td>84,217</td>
<td>73,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>6,942</td>
<td>6,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72,171</td>
<td>69,854</td>
<td>57,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>432</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>864</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>2,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,252</td>
<td>16,596</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All adults</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93,123</td>
<td>91,313</td>
<td>80,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics

Areas classified as ‘deprived’ are more likely to experience hate crimes. 46 per cent of Muslims are clustered in the 10 per cent most deprived areas based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Ali 2015, 46). Though the Crime Survey uses a different scale than this measure, it is clear that Muslims are likely to be more affected by hate crime due to its greater frequency in areas with employment deprivation. The bottom quintile is twice as likely to experience personal hate crime and three times as likely to experience household hate crime as the third and fourth quintiles. The most deprived areas experience general crime at a level only 1.2 times as high as less-deprived ones. This suggests that hate crime is concentrated in areas of deprivation, and as Muslims are among other ethnic minorities are concentrated in those areas (see Jivraj and Khan 2013 in Ali 2015, 46), the geography of deprivation might be one factor in exacerbating anti-Muslim hate. Areas classified as ‘multicultural’, ‘blue collar’, and ‘constrained by
circumstances’ are also the most likely to experience hate crime, fitting with the data on deprivation as minorities are concentrated in deprived and diverse areas (Home Office et. al. 2013a, 1.06).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Indices of Deprivation (Employment)</th>
<th>Personal hate crime</th>
<th>Household hate crime</th>
<th>All hate crime</th>
<th>All CSEW personal crime</th>
<th>All CSEW household crime</th>
<th>All CSEW crime</th>
<th>Unweighted base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20% most deprived output areas</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>14,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other output areas</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>45,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% least deprived output areas</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15,128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.06 Home Office et. al. 2013a

Anti-Muslim hate crime should be understood in the broader context of racial and religious hate crime. While data zeroing in on anti-Muslim hate crimes through specific crime flags is useful, a number of important trends can be extrapolated from the racial and religious data made available in the *Overview of Hate Crime*. First, the police categorise hate against Muslims under both racial and religious monitored strands. This means that Islamophobia cannot easily be categorised as racial or religious; as research indicates, the term transcends definitions of racial and religious hate. It should be understood as a kind of cultural racism. Second, deprivation is an important factor in the likelihood of victimisation as deprived areas have higher rates of hate crime than others. By examining the geography of hate crimes in London boroughs based on data from the Metropolitan Police Service, we see in particular how deprived and highly diverse boroughs are more likely to be affected by hate crime.

5.2 Informal data

A number of civil society organisations in the UK record Islamophobia, adding to the information and research base by focusing on media monitoring and victim perceptions. This section focuses on five sets of contributions made to understanding Islamophobia and hate crime more generally. There are a number of organisations and researchers in the UK that have examined Islamophobia from different perspectives. This section covers media monitoring, a method for picking up the volume and stories of hate crime through methodical searching.
through British local and national media and surveys on victims’ experiences that gives an understanding of Islamophobia as an everyday experience.

In a recent report, the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) focused on a wide definition of ‘hate crime’ and found that 40 per cent of its survey respondents experienced Islamophobia (Ameli et. al. 2011, 6). Their categories include explicit and implicit forms of abuse. They find that about half of the respondents have experienced direct verbal attacks and unfriendly behaviour on the streets (2011, 6). However, the definition of anti-Muslim hate or ‘hate crime’ is extremely broad, with 74.5 per cent of respondents hearing ‘hostile remarks made about Islam’ and 66.9 per cent witnessing ‘political policies affecting Muslims negatively’ (2011, 6). This information usefully demonstrates that Muslims perceive Islamophobia in a variety of institutions, including in public discourse and government policy. However, these are not hate crimes, and while it is unfortunate that ‘64 [per cent] report having been stared at by strangers’, this does not count as a hate incident.

Their report does find that Islamophobia animates a number of relations that affect British Muslims negatively. The IHRC finds that women were more likely than men to be ignored in public and men were more likely to experience discrimination and ‘being talked down to’ (Ameli et. al. 2011, 6). It is particularly important to note that higher income respondents were more likely than others to have heard ‘racially offensive remarks’ or ‘explicit instances of Islamophobia’ (2011, 6), suggesting that while hate crime might be less a concern in higher income areas based on Crime Survey data, anti-Muslim sentiments still exist in less-deprived areas.

The Leicester Hate Crime Project, an ESRC-sponsored project, found that hate crime is an everyday experience for all victims of all strands. They find that 9 of 10 victims experienced verbal abuse, suggesting that language is an important part of contemporary racism (Chakraborti et. al. 2014, 15). They critique the focus on ‘violent and extreme acts of targeted hostility’ in the media, politics, and academic research and instead demonstrate that everyday acts that go ‘unacknowledged’ have serious impacts on victim’s wellbeing. They find that verbal abuse is the most commonly experienced form of hate crime; 48 per cent of those studied reported that they regularly or occasionally experience verbal abuse.

Their research finds a few other characteristics that corroborate details found by the Home Office. Economic deprivation has a significant impact on hate crime: ‘large numbers of
survey respondents received very low or no yearly income. A quarter said they did not receive any income (23 per cent) and one-fifth had an income of £15,000 or less annually (19 per cent). One in five stated that they received benefits (19 per cent)’ (p. 29). Some of these respondents felt that felt that ‘welfare reform had contributed to a rise in their experiences of targeted victimisation’ (Chakraborti et. al. 2014, 29).

The report also provides useful details on the geography of hate crimes, finding that 54 per cent of hate crimes happen in a public street or park, or outside or near the victim’s home (Chakraborti et. al. 2014, 31). Other notable areas include ‘in or around a bar’, near the workplace, ‘on public transport’ and other public locations (26 per cent of incidents). Thus, based on the sample, it is fair to say that offline incidents occur in public or quasi-public areas of the city (2014, 31). Violent crimes are also most likely in these areas (p. 34). This has important consequences for Muslim women, as “dress and appearance” emerged as a significant contributory factor in experiences of hate crime victimisation’ (2014, 25), therefore Muslim women who wear a hijab, niqab, or other form of veil in public are more likely to be targeted. Being out and about in the city can be a prescient concern for Muslim women who may feel vulnerable given the frequencies of verbal abuse and harassment in public spaces. In particular, respondents reflect on the experience of verbal abuse when wearing the headscarf (for example) through a sense of racialisation:

I’ve only just started covering my hair, and people do look upon you differently. You do get picked on and called names more. But they don’t realise who’s Pakistani, who’s Indian and who’s Hindu or Muslim or whatever, they just target you on one thing. Like you’re Muslim, and that’s it. Quote from victim (2014, 26).

It is telling that 61 per cent of hate crime victims ‘avoided walking in certain areas going to a certain place’ in order to feel safer after being victimised and 36 per cent ‘avoided going out at night’ (2014, 52). Victims of all hate crime do isolate themselves as a coping and security strategy. This is concerning because it affects the potential for intercultural interaction as communities and individuals feel the need to isolate themselves in order to feel more safe.

Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) is a confidential third party reporting service that allows victims to report hate crimes and incidents of abuse and discrimination. Tell MAMA provides holistic support and advocacy to victims. The project has seen a record number
of cases both offline (on a street level) as well as online since its inception in 2012 and an increase in offline reports in 2015 comparatively to previous years.

Tell MAMA data is useful in understanding anti-Muslim hate against women because it has detailed information that allows for the disaggregation of gender. In recent years, the service has demonstrated that Muslim women are more likely than men to be victims of hate crimes. Independent analysis of Tell MAMA data in 2013/14 found that online incidents (82 per cent) are mostly forms of verbal abuse and hate speech (2014, 4.3). It is important to note that nearly half of these cases reference the far-right through verified links and ‘recognisable slogans’ (2014, 4.3). Offline victims were more likely to be women, with 54 per cent of offline incidents affecting women (2014, 4.6). While this does seem to suggest that women and men experience Islamophobia at relatively close levels, women do seem to be affected slightly more. It is important to note that often women are more identifiable due to their expression of religious identity through clothing and this might trigger attacks.

A further analysis of Tell MAMA’s data from March 2014-Feb 2015 presents a similar story: of the 34 cases of women targeted with verbal abuse in person, 23 (68 per cent) were wearing identifiably religious clothing.

Findings from 2014 data show that 78 per cent of perpetrators are male (not including incidents with multiple perpetrators) and the majority are white British (81 per cent of male perpetrators are white and 83 per cent of female perpetrators are white). The table below provides more information, based on data submitted to OSCE’s 2014 hate crime monitoring:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender, ethnicity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple or unknown</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total | 145

Around two-thirds of the cases reported to Tell MAMA in 2014 occurred online, which is unsurprising given that social media platforms are used by far-right groups to harass and troll Muslims. The majority of online cases involved anti-Muslim abuse and dissemination of anti-Muslim literature.

Imran Awan (2013) finds that online hate, which has salient impacts on victims, is related to media events. For example, he finds that after the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013, anti-Muslim hate crime ‘intensified following Woolwich’ particularly from accounts that seem to have proclivities associated with the far right (pg 11).

Awan notes that trolling and coordinated online campaigns against Muslims in general and individuals are common and prolific on platforms including Facebook and Twitter (18). This is particularly concerning in the context that the far-right and the ‘counter-jihad’ often relies on social media platforms to radicalise its followers. For example, a Demos report demonstrates that the EDL relies on social media platforms to reach out to its followers and coordinate offline movements (Bartlett and Littler 2011). Awan finds that online hate crime has a significant impact on victims and should be treated with equal concern to offline hate crimes in terms of support provided to victims and the seriousness of the incident in police response. Offline attacks were also mostly verbal abuse, though there are significant numbers of property damage, threats, assault, and extreme violence.

Offline attacks tend to spike during major international incidents. This was most noticeable after the attacks in Paris in November 2015. As is common with these events, Islam and Muslims are blamed for violence, rather than the actions of a violent, terrorist group that perverts Islamic teachings for its own ends. This is often evident in newspaper reporting following these incidents, particularly among British tabloids. In the week following the attacks in Paris, anti-Muslim hate crimes reported to Tell MAMA increased threefold, with 115 attacks observed in one week. With this data, it is possible to recommend to police forces that they are alert to certain events that might trigger anti-Muslim backlashes following major international incidents.

Tell MAMA’s descriptive statistics demonstrate that research done on hate crime in general is highly relevant to understanding anti-Muslim hate. It is one of the few data sets on anti-Muslim hate crime that allows for disaggregation of gender dynamics as well. However,
descriptive statistics can only go so far and the Tell MAMA data set provides rich, qualitative accounts of hate crime experiences, which help us understand the places and forms of anti-Muslim hate crime. A key takeaway from these descriptive statistics should be that Muslims are frequently affected by far-right discourse (particularly from white males) and online hate speech. Further, it shows that men and women are equally affected by anti-Muslim hate crime though men are more frequently the perpetrators of attacks.

6. **Under-reporting of hate crime**

Under-reporting is the primary hurdle to a better understanding of Muslim women’s experiences of Islamophobia. A hate crime victim explained to Tell MAMA in an interview that she did not report having her tires slashed and a xenophobic note left on her windshield to the police because she felt they would make matters worse by drawing attention to the case. She was uncomfortable with her neighbours being questioned about the incident, afraid that such attention would further alienate her from her neighbours and community.

She decided to ‘get on’ with her life after the incident and avoided getting the police involved. Today, however, she regrets not reporting the incident and seeking justice and chose to speak out in order to challenge racist and Islamophobic behaviour (Tell MAMA 2014).

British Muslims feel that abuse and other low-level hate incidents are trivial and not worth reporting (Spalek et. al. 2008). This is a reason cited widely amongst those affected by hate crime incidents in the general population; further, over time hate crime across all strands has been reported less frequently with the most recent numbers showing an 11 per cent decrease (Tell MAMA 2014b, 5, Home Office et al. 2013, 1.08). Another reason for under-reporting is a general lack of awareness of police and third-party reporting services such as Tell MAMA. When the police fail (for a variety of reasons) to attain positive outcomes against a perpetrator, it makes it very unlikely hate crime victims will feel as if reporting is worth risking alienation and embarrassment. Further, recent migrants to the UK may not be aware that hate crime is a punishable offence and may not have the language skills and awareness to seek help from the police or report an incident. There have been few studies of why under-reporting occurs and most evidence is anecdotal. This is a gap in the field that can be remedied with exploration in focus groups with Muslim women.
Table 1.09: Reasons for not reporting crime incident to the police, victims aged 16 and over, 2007/08 and 2008/09 to 2011/12 and 2012/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All hate crime</td>
<td>All CSEW crime</td>
<td>All hate crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trivial/no loss</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police would not/could not do anything</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/dealt with ourselves</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconvenient to report</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to other authorities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common occurrence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of reprisal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike or fear of the police/previous bad experience with the police or courts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other$^3$</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unweighted base$^a$ 225 13,981 195 12,914 117 6,543

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics

(Home Office et. al. 2013a)

The under-reporting of anti-Muslim hate is a significant problem. While racist and religious hate crimes are the most reported hate crimes to the police and other crimes are reported less frequently, there are significant racial disparities in hate crime reporting that should be underlined to consider under-reporting in Muslim communities. For example, many British Muslims feel that low-level incidents are not worth reporting to the police because they feel they will not get results or are unaware that these incidents constitute hate crimes. In addition, the number of hate crime incidents across all strands reported to the police has fallen by 11 per cent since 2007, but due to the low proportion of Muslims reporting hate crime, this might be a
reflection of decisions to report falling over time rather than a drop in the level of hate crime (Home Office et. al. 2013, 1.08).

There is a lack of awareness of reporting centres and services such as Tell MAMA as gaps in knowledge exist within the community about what actually constitutes a hate crime (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010, 41; see also Home Office et. al. 2013c, 48). In addition, the Muslim community has particular grievances around policing in the last decade as counter-terrorism programmes problematise them as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, Spalek 2010, Awan 2012). While arguments that the police have undermined Muslims’ trust seem sensible, data does suggest that Muslims have a relatively equal opinion of the police as do other ethnic groups in the UK (Spalek and Lambert 2007, 12-13, see also Parsons 2010). Findings from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency demonstrate that 79 per cent of Muslims did not report hate crimes to the police (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009, 8). Finally, new migrant communities may not even be aware that hate crime is a punishable offence (2009, 11).

As explained above, Muslims experience racially motivated and religiously motivated hate crime at a proportion higher than other religions. 2.4 per cent of Muslims surveyed over 2011-2013 reported that they experienced some form of hate (Home Office et. al. 2013a, 1.05). Based on a Tell MAMA’s analysis, this proportion that 2.4 per cent of the Muslim population in London (over one million people) gives cause to speculate that over 25,000 people would have experienced hate crime in London alone (Tell MAMA 2014c, 4).

The small number of incidents that Tell MAMA has had reported in and the Metropolitan Police have recorded in is suggestive of the fact that a large number of hate crimes are going unreported. According to findings from the Leicester Hate Crime Project, 56 per cent of all hate crimes were not reported. More serious incidents are more likely to be reported: 60 per cent of victims of violent crime and 62 per cent of victims of property crime reported experiences hate crime to the police (2014, 67). However, in their research into victims of religious hate crime, the researchers at the Leicester Hate Crime Project found that only 23 per cent of respondents reported incidents to the police (Leicester Hate Crime Project 2014, 13).

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4 This number is an estimate based on 2.4 per cent of Muslims claiming an experience of hate crime in the Crime Survey of England and Wales and ONS estimates of the Muslim population in London. This number is speculative, but gives a sense of the volume of hate crimes that are not being reported.
While it is true that under-reporting affects all aspects of hate crime due to strained relationships between ethnic minorities and those sharing other protected characteristics and the police (Chakraborti 2009, 123), there are specific dynamics that affect Muslims. Due to the fact that the Muslim community is highly diverse, certain dynamics might affect victims of hate crimes in different ways and they might face different obstacles to reporting. Following Chakraborti (2009), it should be noted that many of these reasons overlap with other communities. The task of future research should be to untangle what prevents Muslims from reporting hate crimes and what overlaps this has with findings for under-reporting from other communities.

A large proportion of hate crimes do not come to the attention of the police. According to Tell MAMA’s data, ‘nearly 5 of 6 victims of all anti-Muslim incidents (online and offline) did not go to the police. Only 3 per cent of victims of an offline attack went to both Tell MAMA and the police’ (Feldman and Littler 2014, 3). Similarly, the Home Office finds that only 40 per cent of incidents were reported to the police (Home Office et. al. 2013c, 6 in Feldman and Littler 2014, 4.2). Specific research has not been done on Muslim communities and under-reporting, but the fact that reporting rates for LGBT people, Roma people, and people with disabilities are all below 25 per cent (see 2014, 4.2) indicates that it is likely that Tell MAMA and police data give only a snapshot of a much larger picture, as is true for all strands of hate crime.

6.1 Legislation, polices and case law

There are three main pieces of legislation relevant to the prosecution of Islamophobia in the UK:

- Crime and Disorder Act 1998
- Public Order Act 1986, Part III
- Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006

The Crime and Disorder act allows for offenses such as wounding, assault, damage, harassment, and threatening/abusive behaviour to be racially or religiously aggravated. Racial or religious aggravation is defined as (1) “the offender demonstrates to the victim hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group”, and (2) “the office is motivated wholly or partly by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group”
based on their membership (or presumed membership) of that group.” This law provides for anti-Muslim and Islamophobic language to increase the severity of a ‘basic’ crime (such as wounding, harassment, etc.) but would not cover anti-Muslim language or Islamophobic discourse.

Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 covers incitement to racial hatred and affirms Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which asserts freedom of expression. The Public Order Act takes Article 10 seriously but draws the limit (with regards to hate speech) at acts that are “threatening, abusive or insulting” and are likely to stir up racial hatred. In order to secure a conviction around incitement to racial hatred, speech must include words that are threatening, abusive or insulting and either intend to stir up racial hatred or are likely to do so (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.(b)).

The Public Order Act, however, does not cover religious hatred. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 created new offences regarding “stirring up religious hatred”, but the guidelines for prosecution are significantly different. This presents one of the key challenges when it comes to policing anti-Muslim hate crime and Islamophobic abuse. Because Muslims are treated by Islamophobes as a quasi-racial group, Islamophobia is very difficult to prosecute because the law requires that a threat must be demonstrated to secure a conviction on incitement to religious hatred, so abusive language and Islamophobic discourse is protected speech, even at its most vile and hateful. Religious hate crimes have a much higher threshold for conviction because it only covers words that are threatening.

Further, prosecutions under this offence require the consent of the Attorney General and it is significantly much more difficult to prosecute for incitement to religious hatred. Much of the vitriol that is reported to Tell MAMA cannot be prosecuted because it does not directly threaten Muslims and reaches the threshold despite being likely to stir up religious hatred. Language that might be used against Jews and Sikhs (listed as ethno-religious groups under the Public Order Act) could constitute a racial offence whereas the same type of comments directed at Muslims may not be prosecutable.

6.2 Case studies and examples
This section presents a few human stories that contextualise the findings of formal data above. The statements and experiences of Muslim women who have experienced hate crime and reported to Tell MAMA illustrate how hate is an everyday part of life for many British Muslim women. In particular, we find that ‘media events’ and trending new stories about Muslims are referenced in hate crimes, helping to add causal evidence to findings from analysis of Metropolitan Police data on anti-Muslim hate crimes that suggests that the increased presence of ‘Muslim’ issues in press, including ISIS, child sexual exploitation in Rotherham, the ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal and hostilities related to Israel/Palestine conflict are motivating factors in attacks. Women are shouted at to not go ‘beheading’ people—in a clear reference to ISIS—and face verbal abuse based on perceptions of cultural difference. Second, online hate is a serious concern that Tell MAMA has highlighted where we continue to note a particular relationship between anti-Muslim hate and far-right discourse.

A significant amount of recent academic literature on Muslim women has highlighted the relatively high likelihood that they are targeted on an ongoing and systematic basis. In their research on anti-Muslim hate against veiled women, Chakraborti and Zempi (2012) argue:

Given that they are targeted because of the visibility of their Muslim identity (which is easily identifiable when they wear the veil), veiled women who have experienced Islamophobic victimization are unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them was simply random and ‘could have happened to anyone’. Rather, they are forced to view this victimization as an attack on their Muslim identity (2012, 272).

Case anecdotes from Tell MAMA do corroborate this; however, skin colour is also referenced in attacks where religiously identifiable clothing is not present. Informal data suggests that experience of hate crime and Islamophobia intersects with racist language as well; in particular, there is a frequent collocation in Tell MAMA’s data of Muslim with the racial slur ‘Paki’ (Tell MAMA 2014a). Therefore, we should understand Muslim women are subjected to multiple forms of discrimination: hate against their gender, their race, and their religion (Vakulenko 2007, 185, see also Chakraborti and Zempi 2012, 274).

Tell MAMA broadly receives three types of anti-Muslim cases that affect women: threats and verbal abuse, violence and assault, and online hate. Threats and verbal abuse are the most common and it appears to be an almost everyday experience that Muslim women must negotiate as they move through various parts of the city, on public transit, in the street, and in their neighbourhoods. For example, Meer, et al. (2010) explain the veil as a ‘contested signifier’, or a
symbol that generates tensions by representing a failure of integration and an assertion of cultural
difference. By examining the intersections between Islamophobia, cultural difference, and public
discourse on the hijab and other veiling practices, Afshar (2008) finds that ‘women who cover’
were made into ‘[objects] of pity if not fear’ (2008, 420). Veiling is interpreted through
Islamophobic frames and in many cases leads to concrete experiences of hate crime amongst
Muslim women.

Analysis of Tell MAMA’s cases reveals that offline incidents often emerge when
perpetrators are exposed to cultural differences that are seen as associated with Islam or
Muslims. This suggests that anti-Muslim hate is latent, just under the surface and easily
triggered. For example, an elderly woman (who is not visibly Muslim) was waiting at a local bus
stop where a group of women were discussing their dogs.

She jumped into their conversation, asking ‘what use or what good is in keeping dogs?’
The woman informed us that she was asking out of curiosity, feeling naïve. The other women
were offended and one responded saying ‘I’ve seen Muslim women and their kids, and pigs and
dogs are cleaner than them’ and ‘go back to your own country’ (Tell MAMA case, June 2014).
The case illustrates how anti-Muslim verbal abuse emerges in banal, everyday interactions
(Iganski 2008) and have significant impacts on victims as everyday situations become racist and
religiously hateful.

Verbal abuse is a common occurrence on public transit as well. Cases have emerged
regarding the London Underground and bus networks. Other incidents reported to Tell MAMA
have occurred near public institutions, as well as parks, outside shops, cafes, and pubs as women
pass by, and while driving on the road. For example, a woman assisting a BME client and her
three-year-old child outside a public institution speaking Urdu elicited a xenophobic remark from
a man leaving the building who aggressively called on them to ‘speak English’ because ‘you’re
living here’ (Tell MAMA case, October 2014). While this is not a directly Islamophobic, it fits
in with larger anti-immigrant narratives that intersects with anti-Muslim and Islamophobic
sentiments.

Verbal abuse frequently utilises the same language across incidents and is directly related
to stories in the news, fitting with research on the media and the proliferation of anti-Muslim
hate crime that attempts to establish a causal link between trending stories in the media, the
vilification of Muslims, and hate crime (see, for example, Hickman et. al. 2011). Many of the
recent reports that Tell MAMA has received as street based incidents involve language around ‘paedophilia’, referencing the Rotherham child sexual exploitation scandal as well as ‘beheading’ and ‘cutting’, alluding to ISIS and the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in May 2013. For example, a visibly Muslim woman reported a road rage incident to Tell MAMA on 8 September 2014 (a few weeks after the murder of James Foley by ISIS). A car passing hers, a white jeep with two passengers sped by, shouting ‘terrorist’ and ‘don’t go f*****g cutting people’, clearly referencing ISIS (Tell MAMA case, September 2014).

Another incident came in to Tell MAMA when a woman was walking with her mother, aunt, and siblings heard two men shout ‘all of you are f*****g ISIS’ and ‘we hate you f*****g Muslims’ (Tell MAMA case, September 2014). These incidents demonstrate that the language of verbal abuse centres on ongoing news issues that reference Muslim communities in a negative way.

While most cases do end at verbal abuse, abuse and threats are met with violence against Muslim women in varying degrees. One of the most common includes spitting at women who wear the hijab or pulling at their clothing in order to remove it. While this is not an extreme form of violence, it is related to verbal abuse and has a significant impact on women affected by such behaviour, as the following Tell MAMA victims explains:

I was walking through Cabot Circus approx. 9am, I had just seen an old work colleague and stopped to talk about the weekend. [A] man came charging towards me with such aggression I thought he was going to punch me in the face. [He] lunged forward and he spat in my face. I also felt it fall onto my left hand…he continued to aggressively rant at me and said something along the lines of ‘your people are killing’ and something about the ‘Middle East’ and ‘killing Christians’. He spat at me again, it was terrifying I thought he was going to attack me at any second.

I cannot make sense of what he was saying or [reconcile] in my mind why he attacked me, but it is clear that I was targeted because I am a Muslim woman…[I] continued to walk to work, tears streaming, I just wanted to wash myself. It wasn’t until I saw myself in the mirror in the toilet at work that I saw the spit all over my Hijab and it had seeped through to my underscarf too. I immediately began to wash my headscarf, I was in a total state and very upset and angry at what had happened to me.⁵

Based on Crown Prosecution Service guidelines, spitting is a form of ‘common assault’ (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.(a)) and the story of the incident makes clear how verbal abuse in implicated in violent attacks as well. In another incident, a white male who was making anti-

Muslim and racist remarks on a bus punched visibly Muslim woman as she alighted. He pursued her as she tried to cross the street and get away from him and fortunately a passerby was able to help and called the police for her. The man continued to make threats but the other pedestrian was able to prevent further violence (Tell MAMA case, October 2014).

Muslim women experience a significant level of Islamophobia on social media platforms. While in-person attacks often reference world events as they are represented in the news, online abuse does this more frequently. For example, references to ISIS are more explicit and highly offensive on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook than is common on the street. When the story about child sexual exploitation in Rotherham broke, racist trolls on Twitter used the term ‘paedo’ to abuse Muslim users. Tell MAMA research found that Britain First, a prolific far-right political party, hosted discussions on ‘Muslim Grooming Gangs’, opening a site for discussion of Muslims as ‘paedophiles’ and featured conversations that discussed Muslims as ‘scum’. Commenters on the Facebook page went as far as to call for ‘bombings’ and mass ‘deportation’ (Tell MAMA 2014a). Tell MAMA receives regular reports of anti-Muslim comments and literature on social media platforms. The comments are frequently and obviously influenced by stories in the news; comments such as the following are typical: “#NotVotingUKIP Because I hate my culture & ppl so much I will turn a blind eye to white children being raped by muslim paedo gangs” (Tell MAMA case, November 2014). This tweet is not a direct attack on a user (and is therefore unlikely to be considered as hate speech on the Twitter platform) but is typical of Islamophobic activity online and is intimately linked with far-right discourse.

While far-right groups provide a site for anti-Muslim sentiments to proliferate by feeding off of news headlines, individual Facebook and Twitter users make direct attacks on Muslim users as well. Imran Awan has conducted extensive research on Islamophobic trolling and bullying on Twitter, identifying a typology of anti-Muslim Twitter ‘trolls’ (Awan 2014). When trolls target individuals for online abuse and threats, the impact can be devastating. In 2013, a troll with far-right sympathies harassed a young Pakistani woman and Twitter user on multiple occasions. When the troll posted a photo of the woman and her work address, she reported the incident to Tell MAMA. In the tweet that includes the photo, the troll wrote “This is the ugly Pakistani who asked the gormless, terrorist Troll, [Twitter username mentioned, removed], to
stalk Patriots. From London”, and a photo of the woman was attached below. The abusive user also tweeted “I can’t wait to meet you. I so look forward to making your life a living hell.”

Anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia on Twitter and Facebook is a significant concern. While most incidents do not directly threaten individual users, racists and Islamophobes use social media platforms to spread anti-Muslim literature and engage in racist discussions. Often the most radical of these users will single out Muslim users, often women, and engage in targeted campaigns of harassment, abuse, and even threats. These platforms present significant legal challenges in terms of prosecution and at times, social media platforms are not able or not willing to take down such offensive accounts.

7. Good practice

The policing of anti-Muslim hate crime is inconsistent across the UK. Because individual police forces have the prerogative to record different data, information on race does not conform to any specific standard. This makes it extremely difficult to accurately measure the extent of Islamophobia in Britain. However, there have been some examples of good practice. The Metropolitan Police Service has had the capacity to record faith-based hate crimes under separate crime flags at least since 2010 (Parsons 2010). Tell MAMA has acquired data from the Metropolitan Police dating back to 2012. Recently, the Mayor of London’s Office for Policing and Crime (Tell MAMA 2014b) opened a public consultation on hate crime to address under-reporting, preventing repeat victimisation, and ensuring justice for victims.

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) plans to better protect communities from hate crime by committing to an “improved understanding of race, faith, sexuality, gender and disability” (Tell MAMA 2014b, 7). The MPS established a senior partnership group, planned for specialist investigators to work specifically in hate crime, and extended partnership with statutory and civil society bodies. It remains to be seen whether these changes will better serve those affected by hate crime. All the same, given the Metropolitan Police Service’s longer history of dealing with Islamophobic hate crime it is likely that they will provide some lessons to be learned for other

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police forces in the country and other large cities. MOPAC has a number of relevant hate crime initiatives for 2015, outlined in their hate crime plan:

1. Disseminate CPS guidance on hate crime to London schools,
2. Develop a London-wide campaign on reporting in hate crime,
3. Design a smartphone application for reporting,
4. Increase information sharing and partnerships with third-party reporting centres,
5. Introduction of a web-based information portal that provide necessary information and advice to victims,
6. Addressing cybercrime, including online hate on social media platforms,
7. Revise hate crime training with the College of Policing,
8. Increase CPS awareness of hate crime issues,

These are all recent developments in a hate crime plan released in late 2014 and it remains to be seen if these changes do constitute good practice.

The UK Government introduced the Police and Crime Commissioner position in 2012, an elected position to allow democratic oversight of police forces. In some police force areas, this has allowed Muslim communities to articulate their concerns about hate crime and encourage forces to record anti-Muslim hate under a separate crime flag. West Yorkshire police, under Police and Crime Commissioner Mark Burns-Williamson, succeeded in getting West Yorkshire police to record anti-Muslim hate separately and has a number of plans for improving hate crime policing as well. The measures are similar to those of MOPAC, including raising awareness about hate crime, how it can be reported, how the police can help and ensuring proper services are commissioned for victims and witnesses of hate crime with an appreciate of the diversity of strands of hate crime. Finally, the West Yorkshire Police plan includes developing mechanisms to monitor victim satisfaction for hate crime incidents. Again, these are new developments and it
remains to be seen whether these statutory mechanisms will improve hate crime services in the future (West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner 2014).

The elected Police and Crime Commissioners are part of the Government’s plan to address hate crime. The Government’s policy seeks to allow local areas to “develop hate crime strategies that reflect local needs” (HM Government 2012, 8). While this may open up some inconsistencies in terms of nationwide data collection on hate crime, as the case of West Yorkshire suggests, elected officials with power over the police can allow a more rapid delivery of policing strategies tailored to anti-Muslim hate crimes in areas with a large proportion of Muslim residents. The government has focused on “challenging the attitudes that underpin” hate crime, increasing reporting, and “improving the operational response to hate crimes” (2012, 9). This strategy has been implemented through funding of various civil society initiatives across the country, including Tell MAMA.

Tell MAMA has helped a number of victims achieve justice by working with police forces and other partners in governmental and non-governmental sectors. Based on evaluation forms about Tell MAMA from victims, they are generally happy with our level of services, with 58.3 per cent rating Tell MAMA as ‘excellent’ (5/5) and 20.8 per cent ‘very good’ (4/5).\(^7\)

The service met the needs of victims in 87 per cent of cases and the same proportion of service users would use the service again and recommend it to someone else in the future. Users were satisfied at the positive outcomes that Tell MAMA assisted them in obtaining and the speed at which caseworkers responded. One user stated that “a person got back to me very quickly after I filled in a report form”; however, the user pointed out that while she would let the community know about the service, “mosques/community centres/schools, etc. need to know about Tell MAMA.”. In terms of good practice, Tell MAMA is a useful case study in that its caseworkers and partnerships provided a good service.

\(^7\) Based on internal reports of Tell MAMA evaluations.
8. Conclusion and Recommendations

We believe that Islamophobia is a significant challenge to Muslim women that seek employment, who face discrimination at the recruitment stage due to crude, stereotypical assumptions about Muslims’ cultural differences and who experience ethnic and religious pay penalties. This compounds a broader story about the clustering of Muslims in deprived areas and high labour market inactivity. While outstanding academic work has demonstrated the inequalities that Muslims face, this has not been translated into actual policy outcomes in employment equality. The acknowledgement that the Equality Act 2010 is not being fully utilised by those who suffer discrimination at work is important for change. It is evident that employers and employees need better and more in depth training on how to create an inclusive work environment where claims are taken seriously and Muslims do not feel afraid to speak up when facing discrimination. The prevalence of indirect discrimination in the workplace must be tackled in order to remove barriers to advancement for Muslim employees. Muslim women and men would benefit from knowing how to utilise the Equality Act to make a complaint if necessary and navigate this process.

Whilst we welcome Government’s backing of the name-blind recruitment process, we encourage further use of this approach to ensure that all applicants have equal opportunities and make sure Muslim men and women are confident that they will be treated equally when applying for jobs and employers need to demonstrate transparency as well as robust procedures in dealing with complaints. Furthermore, we call for changes into other parts of the recruitment process including, but not limited to, guidelines on composition of the interviewing panel to stop “unconscious bias” against potential recruits from ethnic minorities, including Muslims, and thus to ensure fair and transparent recruitment processes. We also strongly encourage that the private sector increases its implementation of equalities monitoring. Ensuring that all faiths are respected in the workplace and take a zero-tolerance approach to racist and religiously-motivated abuse in the workplace by taking victim experiences seriously, therefore the services that TELL MAMA offers in supporting victims of anti-Muslim hatred are much needed to restore the belief of victims in justice, provide an outlet to their frustration and aid further in integration.
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